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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff/Appellee : 
KENNETH J. WEBSTER : Case No. 990764-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant : 
I. THE TRIAL JUDGE WAS CONSTITUTIONALLY AND 
STATUTORILY BARRED FROM ADMITTING MS. 
GALLEGOS' HEARSAY STATEMENTS AND THEIR 
ADMISSION SEVERELY HARMED THE DEFENSE 
Throughout its brief, the State applies the wrong standard of review, misrepresents 
the facts and confuses the law. The State's erroneous claims to the contrary, Ms. 
Gallegos pointedly accused her husband of misleading her and intentionally taking the 
car. Because her blame-shifting statements lacked trustworthiness, their admission 
deprived Mr. Webster of his right to confrontation. Moreover, the State's failure to notify 
the defense of its intent to admit Ms. Gallegos' statements severely prejudiced the defense 
and barred the State from admitting them. The admission of the statements also violated 
the language and policies behind the Utah constitutional right of a spouse not to testify. 
Because Ms. Gallegos' statements provided the only undisputed evidence of the 
perpetrator's identity and intent, their admission irreparably harmed the defense. 
A. Because Ms. Gallegos' Statements Lacked 
Trustworthiness, Their Admission Violated 
Mr. Webster's Confrontation Rights 
In asserting that Ms. Gallegos' hearsay statements possessed adequate indicia of 
reliability, the State applies an abuse of discretion standard. As this Court has ruled, M[a]n 
admissibility decision is the 'sum of several rulings, each of which may be reviewed 
under a separate standard' of review." State v. Horton, 848 P.2d 708, 713 (Utah Ct. App. 
1993) (quoting State v. Thurman. 846 P.2d 1256, 1270 n.ll (Utah 1993)). When 
reviewing the "legal content of the trial court's ruling," this Court applies a correction of 
error standard. IcL Appellate courts review factual disputes under a clearly erroneous 
standard. State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 781 n.3 (Utah 1991). An abuse of discretion 
standard applies only to "rulings requiring a balancing of factors" such deciding whether 
to admit prior bad acts. Horton. 848 P.2d at 713; see State v. Decorso. 1999 UT 57, Tj 18, 
993 P.2d 837 (applying abuse of discretion standard to prior act evidence). 
A bifurcated standard of review applies to the admission of hearsay statements 
under the Confrontation Clauses of the state and federal constitutions. In determining 
whether a hearsay statement possesses particular guarantees of trustworthiness, courts 
look to the "totality of the circumstances that surround the making of the statement." 
Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 820 (1990). In reviewing a trial court's decision under 
this test, courts review the trial court's legal conclusions for correctness while affording 
some degree of discretion to the trial court because of the wide variety of factual settings 
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possible. State v. Dutchie, 969 P.2d 422, 427 (Utah 1998) (applying test and 
accompanying standard of review to waiver of Miranda warnings). In this case, the facts 
surrounding Ms. Gallegos' statements are undisputed. Thus, this Court need only review 
the correctness of the trial court's legal conclusion to admit the hearsay statements. 
Ms. Gallegos' statements were unreliable as a matter of law. M[W]hen one person 
accuses another of a crime under circumstances in which the declarant stands to gain by 
inculpating another, the accusation is presumptively suspect and must be subject to the 
scrutiny of cross-examination." Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 541 (1986). In equally 
strong terms, this Court has concluded that "statements made in an obvious attempt to 
curry favor with the authorities by inculpating defendant and exculpating declarant, lack 
trustworthiness." State v. Drawn, 791 P.2d 890, 894 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (fn. omitted). 
Despite the State's representations that Ms. Gallegos was not a target of the 
investigation and that she offered her statements spontaneously, the circumstances 
surrounding her statements demonstrate that she "st[ood] to gain" by blaming her husband 
for the missing car. Lee, 476 U.S. at 541. Specifically, the undisputed facts establish that 
Ms. Gallegos solely accused Mr. Webster of taking the car in an "attempt to curry favor 
with the" police. Drawn, 791 P.2d at 894. Officer Cupello testified that he fully 
informed Ms. Gallegos of the gravity of the situation and the nature of his inquiry. 
Before questioning her on the day of Mr. Webster's arrest, Officer Cupello explained the 
following facts: 
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• He first specifically informed Ms. Gallegos that her husband had 
been arrested for possession of a stolen vehicle. R. 38: 112. 
• He then identified the stolen car as the missing 1988 Nissan Stanza. 
R.38: 112-13. 
• He also stated that the police had found the car in the parking lot 
where Ms. Gallegos and Mr. Webster lived. R. 38: 113. 
After conveying this factual background, Officer Cupello relayed Mr. Webster's 
claim that he had never even touched the car. R. 38: 133. Ms. Gallegos immediately 
responded, "He is lying." R. 38: 113. Ms. Gallegos then proceeded to disclaim any 
knowledge that the car was stolen and asserted that Mr. Webster represented that he had 
permission to use the car. R. 38: 113-14. She even admitted to driving the car herself but 
contended that Mr. Webster had returned the car two days previously when he had quit 
his job. R. 38: 113-14. When Officer Cuppello informed Ms. Gallegos that Mr. Webster 
had denied driving the car, she responded, "We have a problem." R. 38: 114. 
These facts establish that Mr. Gallegos was fully aware of the implications of her 
statements. Rather than "spontaneously]" responding to Officer Cupello's questions as 
the State would have this Court believe, Ms. Gallegos was fully apprized that the police 
were investigating the possible theft of a car which she had been using as her own only 
two days previously. She also knew that the her husband had been implicated in that 
alleged crime and that the police were seeking information about it. The only logical 
conclusion to be drawn from these facts is that Ms. Gallegos believed that the police were 
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targeting her for using the car herself. 
Incredulously, the State claims that these facts were "not such that [Ms. Gallegos] 
reasonably would be motivated to divorce herself from the car at her husband's expense." 
State's Brief at 15. Quite the contrary, her use of the car gave her "'strong motivation'" 
to minimize her connection to the car and to implicate her husband. Lee, 476 U.S. at 541 
(quoting Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 141 (1968)). Ms. Gallegos' recognition 
that "We have a problem" eliminated any doubt that she understood the ramifications of 
her comments. R. 38: 114 (emphasis added). 
The State further distorts the facts in arguing that Ms. Gallegos "did not wholly 
exonerate herself of all criminal responsibility for the missing car. State's Brief at 16. 
Ms. Gallegos' immediate response to Mr. Webster's claim not to have touched the car 
was to pointedly accuse Mr. Webster of "lying." She then denied any culpability and 
claimed that Mr. Webster had represented that he had permission to use the car. Thus, 
Ms. Gallegos denied any criminal knowledge and intent and, contrary to the State's 
claims, she was "anxious" to blame her husband for the missing car. State's Brief at 16. 
In addition to mischaracterizing the facts, the State appears to misunderstand the 
inherent unreliability of hearsay statements. The State interprets Ms. Gallegos' motives 
and intentions favorably to its view and repeatedly argues that there is no reason to 
disbelieve Ms. Gallegos or to conclude that she thought she was a target of the 
investigation. State's Brief at 14-16. The State fails to comprehend that hearsay is 
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"'presumptively unreliable.'" Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 818 (1990) (quoting Lee, 
476 U.S. at 543). Thus, "unless an affirmative reason, arising from the circumstances in 
which the statement was made, provides a basis for rebutting the presumption that a 
hearsay statement is not worthy of reliance at trial, the Confrontation Clause requires 
exclusion of the out-of-court statement." Id at 821. No "affirmative reason" rebuts the 
presumption of unreliability. 
The fact that the State admitted the statements through a police officer's memory 
of a distant event further diminishes their reliability. In State v. Bertul 664 P.2d 1181, 
1185 (Utah 1983), the Utah Supreme Court ruled that police reports containing witness 
statements lack reliability because they are "made in part in contemplation of litigation." 
This concern, in turn, raises confrontation issues: 
Although the reports may not be readily described as "dripping 
with motivation to misrepresent," their exclusion is more 
fundamentally explainable on the ground that substantial rights 
under the confrontation clause of the United States Constitution, 
and especially the right of cross-examination, may be severely 
prejudiced when the information in the report calls into question 
the motivation and the accuracy of the perception, recall, the 
manner of the language usage, or the soundness of conclusions 
by the author of the report. 
Id at 1185. For these reasons, the Court, refused to allow the State to admit police 
reports under the business records exception to the hearsay rule for any reason other than 
proving routine matters such as the time and date of a crime. 
These concerns are even more pressing when, instead of admitting police reports, 
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police officers testify in court. Given the time length and the dozens of intervening 
events between an incident and a subsequent criminal trial, police officers must review 
their reports prior to testifying in court to refresh their memories. Accordingly, police 
officer testimony not only raises concerns about reliance on police reports but the 
accuracy of police officers' memories come into play. 
Finally, the admission of Ms. Gallegos' statements was not "'harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt.5" State v. Genovesi. 909 P.2d 916, 922 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (quoting 
Scott v. State, 465 P.2d 620, 622 (Nev. 1970)). Those statements provided the only 
undisputed evidence of the key issues tried below: the perpetrator's identity and intent. 
Despite the State's naked claim that it presented "compelling evidence," the State 
presented no physical evidence linking Mr. Webster to the car. The evidence merely 
showed that the police found the car parked in Mr. Webster's common parking lot. 
Although Mike McGuire saw Mr. Webster driving the car at some unspecified 
time, the State conveniently neglects to mention that Intermountain Volkswagen 
authorized salespersons to test drive used cars. R. 38: 79-80. The fact that Mr. McGuire, 
who oversaw the acquisition and sale of all used cars, did not object when he saw Mr. 
Webster driving the car indicates that Mr. Webster had permission to use it. Because Ms. 
Gallegos' statements provided the only other evidence establishing the identity and intent 
of the person who removed the car, the admission of that evidence cannot be considered 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Genovesi, 909 P.2d at 922. 
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B. The State Failed to Notify the Defense of its 
Intent to Admit The Hearsay Statements 
Under the Residual Exception to the Hearsay 
Rule to the Defense's Extreme Prejudice 
The State's failure to notify the defense of its intent to invoke the residual 
exception to the hearsay rule further barred the admission of Ms. Gallegos' statements. 
The State excuses its duty to provide notice by claiming that Mr. Webster knew of Ms. 
Gallegos' statements. It then blames defense counsel for ''miscalculating]" the State's 
prosecution strategy and minimizes the decisive blow the admission of Ms. Gallegos' 
statements had on the defense. State's Brief at 22. Contrary to the State's claims, the 
residual exception's language and policies require the State to give pretrial notice of its 
intent to invoke the exception. Even under a more liberal interpretation of the notice 
requirement, the State's failure to provide notice unfairly ambushed the defense. 
Utah appellate courts have not addressed the notice requirement under the residual 
exception to the hearsay rule. The federal courts have adopted two approaches. The first 
strictly construes the notice requirement and requires pretrial notice even if the parties are 
aware of the evidence. United States v. LaGrua, 182 F.3d 901, 903 (2d Cir. 1999). 
Article VIII of the Utah Rules of Evidence, which governs the admission of hearsay, 
compels this approach. This Court reviews the trial court's interpretation of court rules 
for correctness and accords no deference to its conclusions of law. Ostler v. Buhler, 1999 
UT 99, ^  5, 989 P.2d 1073. In construing court rules, this Court not only must look at the 
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plain language of the rule but must also view the provision "in the context of the entire 
[regulatory] framework to give effect to the entire . . . scheme." State v. Swapp, 808 P.2d 
115, 121 (UtahCt.App. 1991). 
Every indication in Article VIII points to requiring specific notice before a party 
may invoke the residual exception. Under that Article, parties need only provide pretrial 
notice of an intent to admit hearsay evidence when invoking the residual exception. Utah 
R. Evid. 803(24), 804(b)(5). Article VIII, thus, treats the residual exception differently 
from all other exceptions to the hearsay rule. This special treatment strongly supports 
requiring parties to specify their intent to invoke that particular exception, otherwise the 
notice requirement serves no purpose. 
The language of the residual exception agrees. The exception mandates that the 
proponent of hearsay evidence "makes known to the adverse party sufficiently in advance 
of t r ia l . . . the proponent's intention to offer the statement and the particulars of i t . . . . " 
Utah R. Evid. 804(b)(5) (emphasis added). Requiring the proponent to express an 
"intention" to offer the statement would be superfluous unless the proponent were also 
required to specify the method by which the proponent seeks to admit the evidence. 
Specifically, no need exists to notify an adverse party that a statement exists because that 
fact presumably would be revealed through normal discovery procedures. Thus, an intent 
to admit hearsay under the residual exception appears to contemplate more than 
acknowledging the existence of a statement. The exception itself recognizes this 
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distinction by requiring the proponent to notify the adverse party of the "particulars" of 
the statement rather than simply its existence. 
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit endorses this approach. In LaGrua, 
182 F.3d at 903-04, for example, that court ruled that the proponent of admitting 
deposition testimony did not meet the notice requirement even though the proponent had 
referred to the deposition and its potential use as trial evidence in a pretrial letter to the 
adverse party. The Second Circuit concluded that the residual exception required actual 
notice of the proponent's intent not just alerting the adverse party of the deposition. Id. 
Sound justifications support requiring specific notice. Trustworthiness is of 
paramount concern with the residual exception given its open-ended and ill-defined 
nature. An adverse party cannot effectively test the trustworthiness of a hearsay 
statement under the residual exception unless that party knows well before trial the 
circumstances of the statement and the declarant's and witness's identities. 
Notice also avoids the very dangers that arose in this case: surprising and 
ultimately prejudicing the adverse party. Defense counsel below specifically relied on the 
State's lack of notice and prepared for trial accordingly. Based on his correct assessment 
that no established hearsay exceptions applied and his assurance that Ms. Gallegos would 
not testify, defense counsel represented to the jury that the State could not establish the 
identity of the person who took the car. The admission of Ms. Gallegos' statements 
irrefutably contradicted his claims, thereby devastating the defense and undermining his 
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and Mr. Webster's credibility. 
The State blames defense counsel for being surprised, minimizes the effects of the 
admission of Ms. Gallegos' statements, and disingenuously asserts that the jury was free 
to disbelieve Officer Cupello's testimony. State's Brief at 21-23. The State ignores that 
the residual exception places the burden of providing notice on the proponent. It does not 
require the adverse party to clairvoyantly decipher the State's intentions. Moreover, 
because Officer Cupello's testimony was undisputed, the jury had no reason to doubt it. 
The State's failure to provide pretrial notice destroyed any chance of Mr. Webster 
successfully defending the charges. 
Even under the more liberal approach to the notice requirement, the State failed to 
meet its obligations. This approach excuses the failure to provide notice if: (1) the 
proponent "was not at fault" because the need for the evidence was unanticipated; and, (2) 
the adverse party had a "fair opportunity to meet the proffered evidence." Furtado v. 
Bishop, 604 F.2d 80, 92 (1st Cir. 1979). The State had no excuse for not notifying the 
defense of its intent to invoke the residual exception. In fact, the State discussed with Ms. 
Gallegos before trial her reluctance to testify, and, yet, still failed to consider raising the 
residual exception until the middle of trial. R. 38: 38. 
Likewise, the lack of notice failed to provide Mr. Webster a "fair opportunity to 
meet" the hearsay statements. Furtado, 604 F.2d at 92; Utah R. Evid. 804(b)(5). Waiting 
to invoke the residual exception until after opening statements sabotaged the defense 
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theory and destroyed defense counsel's and Mr. Webster's credibility. The defense was 
merely left to argue unconvincingly that Ms. Gallegos did not identify' the car she and her 
husband had driven. The mid-trial admission of this evidence deprived the defense of a 
"fair" opportunity to meet it. 
C. The Admission of Ms, Gallegos' Hearsay 
Statements Violated the Utah Constitutional 
Ban Against Compelled Spousal Testimony 
Consistent with its prior arguments, the State's discussion of the Utah 
constitutional right to be free from being compelled to testify against a spouse is 
incomplete. The State satisfies itself with asserting that the plain language of Article I, 
section 12 of the Utah Constitution only bars actual testimony. State's Brief at 25-27. In 
doing so, the State fails to even mention Utah's tragic experience with the federal 
government's polygamy prosecutions that prompted the framers of the Utah Constitution 
to "enshrine[]n the spousal testimonial right in the Declaration of Rights. Paul G. Cassell, 
The Mysterious Creation of Search and Seizure Exclusionary Rules Under State 
Constitutions: The Utah Example, 1993 Utah L. Rev. 751, 820 n.431. 
Nor does the State discuss the goals underpinning this right; namely, the 
promotion of marital harmony and the preserving of marriages. Understanding these 
policies and the historical context are essential to interpreting the spousal testimonial right 
because Utah is the only state in the nation that has included this right in its constitution. 
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Apparently, the framers of the Utah Constitution sought to safeguard the spousal 
testimonial right from any threats under federal law or even the Federal Constitution. 
The State's literal interpretation of this right fails to recognize that it is not only the 
act of testifying that ruptures marital relationships but also the fact that a spouse's hearsay 
statements provide '"the means of the other's condemnation."' State v. Robertson. 932 
P.2d 1219, 1227 (Utah 1997) (quoting 8 John H. Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at 
Common Law § 2228 (McNaughton rev. 1961)). When a spouse produces incriminating 
information used at trial, it matters not whether the State presents the evidence through 
the spouse or a third party. The source remains the same. In either case, the fact that a 
spouse causes the other's plight "clearly lead[s] to marital strife." Id 
Limiting the right to actual testimony also risks placing the witness spouse anew in 
the "cruel dilemma" of deciding whether to testify. See Edwin B. Firmage & Richard C. 
Mangrum, Zion in the Courts: A Legal History of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-
Day Saints, 1830-1900 at 209 (1988). Admitting a spouse's incriminating hearsay 
statements after the spouse has invoked the right could prompt the spouse to rethink the 
decision not to testify in an effort to undo the damage. The hearsay statements place the 
spouse a second time "in the unenviable position of either committing perjury or 
testifying to matters that are detrimental to his or her spouse." Robertson, 932 P.2d at 
1227. In this sense, the witness spouse feels "compelled to testify" in violation of the 
plain language of the constitutional provision. Utah Const. Art. I, § 12. 
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The State apparently would have this Court disregard the policies buttressing the 
spousal testimonial right. Instead, the State relies on State v. Carter, 888 P.2d P.2d 629 
(Utah), cert, denied 516 U.S. 858 (1995), to argue that the right only bars "'the spouse's 
testimony in the courtroom.'" IdL at 638-39 (quoting Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 
40, 52 n.12 (1980)) (footnote omitted); see State's Brief at 26. The State conspicuously 
fails to mention the actual holding in Carter that immediately follows the quotation above 
and which addresses this very case: 
The State is free to interrogate and receive information from a 
witness spouse on any matter, including confidential 
communications, so long as the witness spouse's statement is not 
introduced into evidence at trial over the objections of the 
accused spouse. Moreover, the State is free to act upon any 
information received—it may pursue leads, obtain evidence, 
locate witnesses, or engage in any other lawful investigative 
procedure. Evidence discovered as a result of the witness 
spouse's statements and the State's subsequent investigation is 
admissible in court, subject to any relevant constitutional, 
statutory, or evidentiary rules of exclusion. 
Id, at 639 (emphasis added). 
Carter thus holds that the Utah Constitution does not bar the State from using a 
spouse's statements to investigate a crime. But, the opinion recognizes a distinction 
between actually admitting a spouse's statements at trial and simply using them to 
investigate. According to Carter, the real danger lies in introducing "the witness spouse's 
statement... into evidence," not merely testifying. Id. at 639. 
This distinction comports with the policies underlying the spousal testimonial 
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right. Using statements to obtain evidence against a defendant spouse is, at least, one step 
removed from admitting a witness spouse's statements at trial as substantive evidence of 
guilt. Unlike admitting the statements at trial, using them to find other evidence does not 
function like actual trial testimony. Thus, a lower risk for marital discord exists when the 
State merely uses a spouse's hearsay statements to investigate a crime. 
The State further diverts attention away from the merits of this issue by claiming 
that Mr. Webster lacks standing to "invoke his wife's testimonial privilege." State's Brief 
at 24. The cases the State cites and its arguments supporting this claim are inapposite. 
Ms. Gallegos invoked her constitutional right not to testify. Thus, Mr. Webster has never 
sought to "invoke" his wife's right on her behalf. 
In any event, the policies supporting the spousal testimonial right demands that the 
defendant spouse be allowed to enforce the right once the witness spouse has invoked it. 
Presumably, when a witness spouse chooses not to testify he or she seeks to preserve 
marital harmony. To prevent threatening the marriage relationship through the admission 
of the witness spouse's hearsay statements, someone has to object to their admission. The 
State apparently would require the witness spouse to inject him or herself into the 
proceedings even though that spouse is not a party and is no longer before the court as a 
witness. This approach either requires a legal-sawy witness spouse to object to the 
hearsay or defense counsel must advise the witness spouse to do so. Such a scheme is 
unrealistic and raises a host of problems including potential conflicts of interest. This 
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view further allows the State to violate the spousal testimonial right without an effective 
remedy. 
The State erroneously treats the spousal testimonial right like an individual right 
such as the ban against unreasonable searches or the right against self-incrimination. 
Unlike those rights, the right against compelled spousal testimony focuses not an 
individual liberty interest but preserving the marriage entity. As a member of the marital 
unit, the defendant spouse has an equal interest in preserving the marriage. In fact, Carter 
appeared to contemplate this very conclusion when it barred trial courts from admitting a 
spouse's statements "over the objections of the accused spouse." 888 P.2d at 639 
(emphasis added). 
The State further avoids addressing the merits of this issue by asserting that Mr. 
Webster did not preserve his arguments in the trial court. To the contrary, the trial court 
record reveals that defense counsel specifically raised the spousal right not to testify in a 
pretrial motion. R. 22-23. He then prompted the trial judge to thoroughly explain to Ms. 
Gallegos the policies supporting the right. R. 38: 52. When the State elicited Ms. 
Gallegos' hearsay statements from Officer Cupello, defense counsel specifically objected 
to their admission. R. 38: 113. Then, during the hearing on whether to admit Ms. 
Gallegos' hearsay statements, defense counsel expressed his concern that entering the 
statements into evidence would effectively allow Ms. Gallegos "to testify without having 
to testify" in violation of Mr. Webster's right to confrontation. R. 38: 103. 
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Even if defense counsel did not sufficiently preserve this issue, the trial judge 
plainly erred in admitting the hearsay statements. Under the plain error doctrine, this 
Court will review an issue when (1) the trial court errs; (2) "the error should have been 
obvious to the trial court;" and (3) "absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a 
more favorable outcome for the appellant " State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 
(Utah 1993). As detailed above, the admission of a spouse's incriminating hearsay 
statements violated the spousal testimonial right just as if the spouse actually testifies. 
Given Carter's warning not to admit "the witness spouse's statement... into evidence at 
trial over the objections of the accused spouse" this error should have been apparent to the 
trial judge. Carter, 888 P.2d at 639. Finally, Ms. Gallegos' statements directly resulted in 
Mr. Webster's conviction because they provided the only evidence establishing the 
perpetrator's identity and intent. Thus, the trial judge plainly erred in admitting Ms. 
Gallegos' statements after she invoked her right not to testify. 
II. THE ADMISSION OF THE PRIOR OFFENSE SIMPLY 
SERVED TO PREJUDICE THE DEFENSE 
Like the admission of the hearsay statements, the State misconstrues the 
circumstances surrounding the admission of Mr. Webster's prior offense and minimizes 
the devastating effects that evidence had on the trial. The prior offense had little 
probative value because it occurred seven years previously and was totally unconnected 
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to this case. In any event, the striking similarities between this case and the prior offense 
severely biased the jury. 
The State erroneously contends that identity, intent and absence of mistake remain 
at issue even if the trial court properly admitted Ms. Gallegos' hearsay statements. To the 
contrary, Ms. Gallegos' statements conclusively established the perpetrator's identity. 
When identity is not at issue, the trial court abuses its discretion in admitting prior crimes 
evidence for that purpose. State v. Featherson, 781 P.2d 424, 429-30 (Utah 1989). 
Further, Ms. Gallegos' allegations eliminated any possibility that Mr. Webster 
mistakenly took the car. She claimed that Mr. Webster (1) lied about taking the car, (2) 
misrepresented that he had permission to use it, and (3) knew that he had to return the car 
before terminating his employment. This evidence shows that Mr. Webster intentionally 
took the car. 
The State attacks Mr. Webster for claiming on appeal that Ms. Gallegos' 
statements rendered identity, intent and absence of mistake nonissues because it notes that 
at trial Mr. Webster challenged the adequacy of the evidence of these issues. State's 
Brief at 29. Mr. Webster should hardly be faulted for exercising his due process right to 
require the State to prove every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. In any 
event, the State fails to appreciate that defense counsel adopted this trial strategy based on 
his reliance that the State had not given him notice of its intent to admit Ms. Gallegos' 
hearsay statements under the residual hearsay exception. Once defense counsel had 
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committed to this course, he could not have abandoned it midstream without completely 
destroying his credibility before the jury. 
Even if identity, intent or absence of mistake remained issues below, the trial judge 
failed to "scrupulously examine[]" the admissibility of the prior act evidence. State v. 
Decorso. 1999 UT 57, If 18, 993 P.2d 837. As the State concedes, the trial judge knew 
nothing about the circumstances of the prior conviction. State's Brief at 29. He never 
inquired into the circumstances of the crime, the type of crime for which Mr. Webster 
was convicted or the required mental state for the conviction. The only evidence of that 
incident was Officer Cupello's statement that Mr. Webster admitted to being convicted 
for "driving a vehicle off of a dealership lot." R. 38: 112. Thus, the prior crime evidence 
failed to even address Mr. Webster's knowledge or intent in taking the car in either 
instance. 
The trial judge further failed to even acknowledge the lengthy time gap between 
this case and the prior offense. Evidence of a prior crime "'must be reasonably close in 
time to the crime charged.'" Featherson, 781 P.2d at 430 (quoting United States v. Cuch, 
842 F.2d 1173, 1176 (10th Cir. 1988)). The seven-year time gap between incidents 
renders the prior offense useless. As the Utah Supreme Court recently concluded, 
"unrelated" but similar offenses are rarely relevant. State v. Reed. 2000 UT 68, % 28 & 
n.3 (involving unrelated sex crimes). 
Even assuming the prior act had probative value, the lack of detail and the 
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similarities between the crimes ensured the jury would be prejudiced. The State claims 
that the absence of circumstances surrounding the prior act Msanitize[d],f the offense for 
the jury. State's Brief at 32. If anything, the lack of context persuades against admitting 
the evidence because it invited the jury to fill in gaps to make sense of the prior crime. In 
this case, for example, logic dictated to the jury that the trial judge had no reason to admit 
the prior crime evidence unless it was similar to the present case. 
The absence of detail and the apparent similarities between the offenses sent the 
obvious message to the jury that because Mr. Webster committed a similar crime 
previously he must have committed the same crime again. The prior act simply served to 
show that Mr. Webster had a "propensity" to steal cars from car dealers. State v. 
Saunders. 1999 UT 59, U 15, 992 P.2d 951. This very fear is at the heart of the 
prohibition against admitting prior crimes evidence. Id The trial judge, thus, abused his 
discretion in admitting it. 
III. UNDER ANY PROPOSED VIEW OF THE JURY'S 
VERDICT, THE JURY CONVICTED MR. WEBSTER 
UNDER SUBSECTION 3(E) OF THE WRONGFUL 
APPROPRIATION STATUTE WHICH IMPOSED AN 
INFRACTION OR, AT MOST, A CLASS A 
MISDEMEANOR 
The State misunderstands the jury's verdict and the applicable law concerning Mr. 
Webster's conviction and punishment. Rather than convicting Mr. Webster under 
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subsection 3(a) of the wrongful appropriation statute, the jury specifically convicted Mr. 
Webster of taking a motor vehicle under subsection 3(e). But, because the legislature 
failed to specify the penalty for that crime, this Court must decide the appropriate 
punishment. Regardless of which statute actually defined Mr. Webster's offense, Mr. 
Webster only committed an infraction or, at most, a class A misdemeanor. 
As a threshold matter, this Court must decide under which subsection of the 
wrongful appropriation statute the jury found Mr. Webster guilty. The State concedes 
that Mr. Webster was specifically charged, tried and convicted for taking "an operable 
motor vehicle." State's Brief at 34-35. At all relevant instances, subsection 3(e) applied 
to the "unauthorized control of motor vehicles." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404.5(3)(e) 
(Supp. 1998). In contrast, subsection 3(a) applied to wrongful appropriation crimes 
generally. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404.5(3)(a) (1999). Since "a more specific provision 
always takes precedence over a more general provision," it appears to be axiomatic that 
the jury convicted Mr. Webster under subsection 3(e) of the wrongful appropriation 
statute. State v. Hinson. 966 P.2d 273, 277 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). 
Although not entirely clear from the State's brief, the State, nevertheless, appears 
to reason that subsections 3(a) and 3(e) define distinct offenses and that the jury convicted 
Mr. Webster of a greater crime under subsection 3(a). State's Brief at 37-38. 
Specifically, the State argues that subsection 3(a) requires the specific intent to 
"temporarily deprive" a person of possession of property. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-
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404.5(1) (Supp. 1998); see State's Brief at 38-39. The State then asserts that subsection 
3(e) requires no such intent. Because the jury found that Mr. Webster had an intent to 
temporarily take the car, the State claims that subsection 3(a) applies. 
The State confuses the wrongful appropriation statute. That provision defined 
wrongful appropriation the same under both subsections 3(a) and 3(e), including the same 
mental state: 
(1) A person commits wrongful appropriation if he 
obtains or exercises unauthorized control over the property of 
another, without the consent of the owner or legal custodian and 
with the intent to temporarily appropriate, possess, or use the 
property or to temporarily deprive the owner of legal custodian 
of possession of the property." 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404.5(1) (Supp. 1998) (emphasis added). Following this 
definition, subsections 3(a) through 3(e) listed various penalties depending on the type 
and value of the property taken. But, they did not define separate offenses. 
The State erroneously assumes that subsection 3(e)'s reference to "an act of 
unauthorized control of motor vehicles" defines a separate offense. State's Brief at 38; 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404.5(3)(e) (Supp. 1998). The State, like the trial judge below, 
fails to recognize that section 76-6-404.5 specifically defines wrongful appropriation as 
obtaining or exercising "unauthorized control" over property. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-
404.5(1) (Supp. 1998). Rather than referring to a separate crime, subsection 3(e) simply 
gives a shorthand definition of the crime of wrongful appropriation. 
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Even if subsection 3(e) referenced to the crime of "unauthorized control/' the 
definition of that crime appears to be identical to the definition of wrongful appropriation. 
At the time of Mr. Webster's offense, two statutes in the Motor Vehicle Act criminalized 
the temporary misuse of a motor vehicle: (1) unlawful control of a motor vehicle under 
Utah Code Annotated section 41-la-1311 (1993) to which subsection 3(e) referred; and, 
(2) unauthorized control of a vehicle for an extended time under 41-1 a-1314 (1998). The 
definitions for both of these crimes are virtually identical to the definition for wrongful 
appropriation, including the mental state. See Addenda A, B. 
Thus, under any of the above scenarios, the jury specifically found that Mr. 
Webster possessed the same intent under both subsection 3(a) and subsection 3(e). Since 
subsection 3(e) specifically applied to motor vehicles, the law requires this Court to apply 
that provision as the more specific one. State v. Hinson, 966 P.2d 273, 277 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1998). In sum, subsection 3(e) controls. 
Having established the correct subsection, this Court must decide the penalty under 
that provision. The State correctly argues that Utah Code Annotated section 76-3-105(2) 
(1999) requires trial judges to impose an infraction only when the legislature fails to 
specify the penalty for crimes defined "outside this code." In contrast, section 76-3-105 
professes that crimes defined "within this code [are] expressly designated11 as infractions. 
Utah Code Annotated § 76-3-105(2) (1999). The "code" referred to appears to mean the 
Criminal Code under Title 76 of the Utah Code. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-101 (1999) 
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(designating Title 76 as the "Utah Criminal Code"). 
If this Court concludes that subsection 3(e) refers to the crime of unauthorized 
control of a vehicle under one of the sections of the Motor Vehicle Act, Mr. Webster only 
committed an infraction. Section 76-3-105 compels this result because the offense of 
unauthorized control was "defined outside" the Criminal Code and the legislature failed to 
specify any penalty under subsection 3(e). 
On the other hand, if this Court concludes that the wrongful appropriation statute 
defined Mr. Webster's offense, section 76-3-105 does not specify the procedure for 
determining the penalty because Mr. Webster's crime would be defined "within" the 
Criminal Code. As explained above, section 76-3-105 does not address this situation. It 
simply assumes that crimes defined within the Criminal Code have specified penalties. 
The rule of lenity provides the answer. This court has ruled that "in case of doubt 
or uncertainty as to the degree of crime, [the accused] is entitled to the lesser.'" State v. 
Patience, 944 P.2d 381, 385 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (quoting State v. Tapp. 490 P.2d 334, 
336 (Utah 1971)). In this case, the rule requires imposition of either an infraction or the 
former penalty under subsection 3(e), a class A misdemeanor, rather than a third degree 
felony which is now in force. 
The ban against ex post fact laws confirms this conclusion. U.S. Const, art. I; § 
9(3); Utah Const., art. I; § 18. As explained, at most, Mr. Webster committed a class A 
misdemeanor when he temporarily took the car. Increasing the penalty now to a third 
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degree felony makes the punishment for his crime more '"burdensome"' after he 
committed it. State v. Dominguez, 1999 UT App. 343,^12, 992 P.2d 995 (quoting 
Monson v. Carver. 928 P.2d 1017, 1026 (Utah 1996) (additional citations omitted)). The 
Constitution forbids such action. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse Mr. Webster's conviction and remand for a new trial, or 
in the alternative, vacate his sentence and order the trial judge to impose an infraction or a 
class A misdemeanor. 
Dated this 3c^ day of August, 2000. 
KENT R. HART 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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41-la-1311. Unlawful control over motor vehicles, trailers, 
or semitrailers — Penalties — Effect of prior con-
sent — Accessory or accomplice. 
(1) It is a class A misdemeanor for a person to exercise unauthorized control 
over a motor vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer not his own, without the consent of 
the owner or lawful custodian and with intent to temporarily deprive the 
owner or lawful custodian of possession of the motor vehicle, trailer, or semi-
trailer. 
(2) The consent of the owner or legal custodian of a motor vehicle, trailer, or 
semitrailer to its control by the actor is not in any case presumed or implied 
because of the owner's or legal custodian's consent on a previous occasion to 
the control of the motor vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer by the same or a differ-
ent person. 
(3) Any person who assists in, or is a party or accessory to or an accomplice 
in, an unauthorized taking or driving is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
History: L. 1935, ch. 46, § 100; 1941, ch. 
50, § 1; 1941 (2nd S.S.), ch. 12, § 1; C. 1943, 
57-3a-110; L. 1983, ch. 190, § 2; 1986, ch. 32, 
§ 1; 1987, ch. 92, § 52; C. 1953, 41-M09; re-
numbered by L. 1992, ch. 1, § 168. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amend-
ment, effective January 30, 1992, renumbered 
this section, which formerly appeared as 
§ 41-1-109; substituted "motor vehicle, trailer, 
or semitrailer" for "vehicle" in three places; de-
leted former Subsection (2) which made an of-
fense under the section a third-degree felony if 
the vehicle was not returned within 24 hours; 
redesignated former Subsections (3) and (4) as 
Subsections (2) and t3); and made stylistic 
changes. 
Cross-Beferences. — Sentencing for misde-
meanors, §§ 76-3-201, 76-3-204, 76-3-301. 
ADDENDUM B 
41-la-1314. Unauthorized control for extended time. 
(1) Except as provided in Subsection (3), it is a class A misdemeanor for a 
person to exercise unauthorized control over a motor vehicle, trailer, or 
semitrailer, not his own, without the consent of the owner or lawful custodian, 
and with the intent to temporarily deprive the owner or lawful custodian of 
possession of the motor vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer. 
(2) The consent of the owner or legal custodian of a motor vehicle, trailer, or 
semitrailer to its control by the actor is not in any case presumed or implied 
because of the owner's or legal custodian's consent on a previous occasion to the 
control of the motor vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer by the same or a different 
person. 
(3) Violation of this section is a third degree felony if: 
(a) the person does not return the motor vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer 
to the owner or lawful custodian within 24 hours after the exercise of 
unlawful control; or 
(b) regardless of the mental state or conduct of the person committing 
the offense: 
(i) the motor vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer is damaged in an 
amount of $500 or more; 
(ii) the motor vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer is used to commit a 
felony; or 
(iii) the motor vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer is damaged in any 
amount to facilitate entry into it or its operation. 
(4) It is not a defense to Subsection (3)(a) that someone other than the 
person, or an agent of the person, returned the motor vehicle, trailer, or 
semitrailer within 24 hours. 
History: C. 1953, 41-la-1314, enacted by 
L. 1992, ch. 1, § 171; 1997, ch. 100, § 1. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amend-
ment, effective May 5, 1997, rewrote Subsec-
tion (1), moving the former provisions to Sub-
section (3)(a), and added Subsections (3) and 
(4). 
Cross-References. — Sentencing for felo-
nies, §§ 76-3-201, 76-3-203, 76-3-301. 
Sentencing for misdemeanors, §§ 76-3-201, 
76-3-204, 76-3-301. 
